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In this paper, I seek to understand the behavioral basis of higher organizational learning and adaption 
as a teleological dynamic equilibrium process to decipher the underlying psycho-physiological 
aspects of individual cognitive learning related to organizational adaption. Dynamics of cognitive 
learning has some differential paths within the neural circuitry which follows certain patterns that 
leads to individual as well as organized evolution in course of a learning process. I undertake a 
comparative analysis of human cognitive and behavioral changes and the active mechanisms 
underlying animal behavior and learning processes to understand the differential patterns of these 
adaptive changes in these two species. Cognitive behavioral learning processes have certain 
economic perspectives which help an individual to attain efficiency in workplace adaptation and in 
learning which however, the individual when being part of an alliance, ember positive influence on the 
society or organization as a whole. Comparatively, in primates, I review some empirical evidences 
drawn from chronological studies about cognitive behavioral learning process and adaptation as well 
as the presence of the capacity of making attributions about mental states, which exists in rudimentary 
form in chimpanzees and apes. Following this, I apply the outcomes of the findings on different 
aspects of human cognitive and adaptive behavioral learning-induced evolutionary changes and how 
human beings are able to exploit the presence of these additive advantages under cluster settings.  
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1. Introduction 
 
                                       System: “An ordered arrangement of physical or abstract entities.” 
                                                                                                                                            -   D.J. McFarland 
 
Organizational adaption is attributable to changes in 
both its adaptive environmental externalities and its 
guided functional derivatives. Organizations change 
because human intentions, desires and goals change. 
Following synchronized change in actions these 
changes are almost invariably brought about by some 
conjugated pleiotropic innovations in learning,  
 
information acquisition, its perceptual understanding 
supplementary to its application, and its continual 
rational adaption owing to interoceptive conditioning in 
response to the interactions among the external 
environment and the internal milieu. Most, if not all of 
these changes, are induced by learning- whether 
observational, or in the course of logical training. 
Human learning in consequence and by itself is self-
motivating; as human actions are driven by 
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heteromorphic polar motive forces deliberated for 
innovation and skill acquisition. Contrarily in animals, 
learning is observational, isotropic, non-polar and non-
motivated, without a need for correction of errors and 
encouragement for success. This is the reason why the 
intention of one who finds through evolution that, there 
is petite or no innovation in nest building by birds which 
is although, its innate behavior (a bird may build her 
nest but will never reinforce that with concrete bricks, 
slabs or mortars) tend to be adaptive through evolution 
in its innate behavior to its natural habitat. This 
analogously may be referred to the agents under the 
frames of organizational settings, where, a better 
understanding of why and how organizations change 
would require an inquisitive mind to search for some 
deeper sympathetic considerations of the underlying 
behavioral, psychoanalytical and socio-physiological 
aspects of changes in human cognitive system. A 
further stride into superior understanding would require 
explicating the principles of neurological basis of 
homeostatic changes in the human physiological 
environment brought about by interactions of the 
external milieu with the internal environment, of what 
enduring changes do learning bring on (through 
innovations in evolution of neuropeptides, or simply, by 
training of memory). As such, and in this title, 
understanding the dynamics of human behavioral 
actions still remain one of the most fundamentally 
intriguing and rewardingly motivational subject matter of 
analysis among behavioral neuropsychologists, 
economic theorists and social scientists to this day. The 
interests have grown in leaps and bounds as new 
theories of mind and about origin of behavior have been 
brought up-front. Several aspects of human behavior 
and behavioral learning based on teleological principles 
have been explained by Cayla (2008) with special 
reference to the process allied to the dimensions of 
organizational adaptations relative to changes in human 
behavioral learning.  
 
     In this paper, I investigate these causal transitions 
that human beings undergo in their intellectual 
conceptions and try to understand the behavioral 
foundations of cognitive changes on account of learning 
process. Learning process is distinct from random 
change. It is an organized and ordered change in the 
human cognitive system. Evolution of behavior of a 
learning system is a path dependency process which 
brings about some permanent changes in the cognitive 
system. This induces changes in human intellectual 
comprehensions and cognitive perceptions. Questions 
that are of central in importance to the understanding of 
behavioral adaptiveness as well as of factors that 
determines the characteristics of human behavior, have 
been extended to the sub-domain of primates, non-
primate vertebrates and invertebrates in order to 
decode the comparative nature and specific forms of 
animal behavioral patterns as well as to understand 
human intelligence in evolution by comparing it with that 
of other species (Lorenz 1950). Previously and in 
particular, social transmission of acquired behavior in 
vertebrates has been defined by Galef (1975) while 
Keverne (1992) underlined primate social relationships, 
their determinants and consequences. Unfortunately, 
man has no immediate cognitive neighbors who 
possess functionally equivalent conditional states of 
cognitive equilibrium, since, the ability to respond to 
second-order relations are lacking in non-primates. 
However, the capacity of making attributions about 
mental states, which exists in rudimentary form in 
chimpanzees and apes, do not directly qualify this 
primate specie as our cognitive neighbor, albeit in 
evolutionary sense, this may mean so to some extent. 
Thus, measuring the efficiency of intellectual equipment 
of a species relates to the ability to respond to 
representations of various items and there exists no 
formal methods by which to interrogate a nonverbal 
organism, say, a bird or a cat. Animals in effect, lack 
the ability to respond to relations between relations and 
relative associations between items and objects. 
However, several aspects of observational learning 
skills have been identified in primates through the 
growing use of training programs to teach language to 
primates (chimpanzee, apes) with some success, and 
in non-primates(rats, pigeons etc), with no success. 
Developments in cognitive neuroscience and the neural 
mechanisms underlying evolution in communication, 
social interaction and behavioral learning have come a 
long way since Veblen’s introduction of teleological 
principles underlying evolutionary process.  
 
    Thornstein Veblen (1898)stressed on teleological 
process of learning; the importance of human intentions 
in evolution as his well-marked teleological principles 
which represents intentional goal oriented learning 
process, a move away from the strict Darwinian 
analogy. Garrouste’s (2007) however considers both 
dynamic equilibrium and evolution as complementary in 
[3] 
 
his concept of dynamic equilibrium where, ∆    the 
dynamic process, which is individualistic behavioral 
learning process aimed at evolutionary adaptation. 
Veblen’s teleological principles were based on a 
system’s evaluation of the relation between its 
intentions and its behavior where, intentions may be 
expressed as goals. It is important to connote that 
certain actions are required for perceptions which are 
determined by the specific nature of goals. Hence, 
goals are required for actions and so also, actions must 
be performed to achieve those goals. So, actions and 
goals tend to be complementary in this sense. 
Evolutionary adaptations are primarily driven by the 
need for change although change is a constituent of 
continued evolutionary process which is self-motivated, 
and is driven by alterations in human intentions 
determined by changes in habits of thought. In modern 
evolutionary analysis, teleological aspects of human 
behavior that define the magnitude of human actions 
and intentions in evolution have gained much 
momentum when defining the origins of behavior (Cayla 
2008). I try to relate this concept to the theories behind 
why and how organizations change which is an 
interesting topic for pursuit among theorists and 
practitioners alike under the realms of New Institutional 
Economics. Organizations adapt and change from the 
consequences of functional intentions of human beings 
which contemporaneously adapt and change. These 
changes are on account of adoption and acquisition of 
new process techniques, new information and 
innovation in human capital (Mac Cormack et al. 2007, 
Ricceri and Guthrie, 2007).  
 
    In business firms and organizations, the primary form 
of intangible resources (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993) 
include structural resources which are knowledge 
owned and embedded, human resources which are 
work driven employee knowledge, experience and 
skills, and positional resources that include image, 
brand and its other relational externalities.  Since 
human capital forms the core part of any organization, 
be it of business, society, institute, group or union, any 
changes in individual and collective behavioral 
processes exert forces of change on the part of the 
organization to adapt. As do businesses and products 
which evolve from the need for change in response to 
changes in preferential consumer requirement patterns 
and desire specifications, continual learning about 
changing environmental externalities fills the gap 
between equilibrium and evolutionary process of 
organizational adaptation. Learning is an organized 
change and the results of learning lead to a process of 
permanent changes in behavior as an outcome of 
environmental interactions affecting both individual and 
organization behavior. David Cayla (2008) in his paper 
enumerated the dynamics of cognitive learning patterns 
of organizations which preliminary aim at two non-trivial 
aspects; one is goal oriented- that is, what 
organizations should do, and the other focusing on 
fitness and adaption or process oriented-which is, how 
they do? Since learning is a dynamic process, it follows 
some determined trajectory based on rules which 
modifies its outcome. Under stable agent behavior, 
learning is determined by rules that do not change, and 
which lead to results that can be predestined. Hence, it 
is possible to foresee the outcome of learning 
processes which has some bordered rationality inside 
ex ante determined trajectory under stable agent 
behavior, without changing the rules of the moving 
process.  
 
      It is worth noting that organizations thrive to adapt 
continuously to external conditions as well emphasize 
on internal hierarchical decisions for change. Hence, 
organizations persistently tend to balance the 
learning process between equilibrium and evolution. 
My goal in this paper is to engage in these topics for 
a theoretical discourse and to discuss several facets 
related to the behavioral aspects of organizational 
learning and adaptation and hence, understand the 
employee-management behavior cycle in terms of 
organizational evolution. This paper is structured into 
three centralized sections followed by a conclusion. In 
the first section, I provide a background review of 
settings to be based on informative analysis to 
understand why and how organizations change 
matted on the backdrop of teleological principles. In 
continuum under this section, I envisage the neuro-
behavioral theory of organizational evolution with a 
deeper understanding of the processes that underlie 
evolutionary behavior of the learning systems. 
Following this, I underline the conceptual dynamicity 
of organizational adaptation through a model 
conception to understand agent behavior 
heterogeneity in organization structures from simple 
mathematical point of view. Then, I perform a 
deductive analysis of the economic implications of 
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comparative learning methods in agents to interpret 
the adaptive changes in human intelligence and its 
applications under organizational settings. In 
introspection, I provide explanations on what 
organizations can learn and the effect of learning on 
genes as well as the expositions of agent adaptation 
processes by theoretical understanding of the 
interactions between teleological learning process, 
the environment and genes. I also try to delineate 
how organizations can associate and extract 
meaningful representational information from animal 
behavior, since, learning from animals on how they 
compose sequences and interpret those causality 
exemplifying schemas may provide some original 
observational schemas which would be probable to 
apply under organizational surroundings. During this 
discourse, even if in theory, I find strong evidences 
that some familiar yet relevant form of organizational 
structures exists in both primates and invertebrates 
on ethological context. In significance, I provide a 
short description of my communication to narrate all 
my findings followed by a concluding remark and 
scope for further research on these subjects.   
2. Background Review 
To gain an overall understanding of the depth and 
breadth of this subject matter which is- organizational 
adaptation through learning, it may require going 
beyond the established routes of entangling the 
comparative aspects of cognitive learning and social 
behavior in human beings and the animal kingdom. 
This paper is based on purely multidimensional 
evaluation of a single process-learning, as well as its 
investigational form of implications as a basis for 
comparative analysis of the principles underlying 
cognitive and behavioral learning process 
modifications in both human and primates with some 
special reference to job holders or, agents. It has 
been established that some form of primordial social 
organization skills exists in non-human primates and 
other animals from time immemorial (Lorenz 1950) 
which has undergone little alterations. For example, 
the mechanism by which bees encode about the 
location and quantity of a food (honey) relative to its 
hive in its dance which a second bee decode. This is 
an example of general representation capacity of 
non-primate species that recognize representations of 
various conditions. Evidence of pro-social behavior in 
primates have been elucidated which is an interesting 
topic among social ethnologists and animal 
psychologists. Several methods are being adopted to 
interrogate a nonverbal organism by employing social 
cues. Chimpanzees and apes have been able to 
acquire words and learn by social cues based on 
repetitive practice on composite instructions where 
they able to recognize representations of their own 
behavior or behavior which they have observed in 
others. They do this by composing causality 
exemplifying schema on their own. However since 
they do not possess any instinctive language learning 
abilities similar to humans, their processing time in 
learning instructions, comprehension and production 
using social cues is awfully time intense. Contrarily in 
humans, it has been assumed that syntax for learning 
language is built into the nervous system from 
antiquity, as well as the capacity to reason something 
special (Dulany, 1962). It has also been observed 
that although nest building activity by birds is a 
complex task which is their innate behavior, they lack 
problem solving and discrimination capacities. Human 
beings on the other end possess high degree of 
transitive reasoning processing strategies on account 
of higher memory capacity utilization. One may refer 
to Griffin (1976) and Beer (1992) for classic 
representations of these phenomena within the 
domain of cognitive ethology. 
A. Evolutionary Process and its Impact on Agent 
Behavior: 
There are numerous factors that determine agent 
behavior in the evolutionary process of learning to 
achieve goals. With heterogenic agent behavior, path 
trajectory of a learning process depends on rules set 
by routines (Feldman 2000). As long as rules tend to 
remain unchanged under bounded rationality, 
specified actions are required to achieve goals. 
However, a system’s behavior as well as the learning 
process may be affected by the environment in which 
goals determine actions of a moving process, which 
in turn, determine a system’s behavior. Thus, goals 
modify a determined trajectory of a moving process 
under dynamic equilibrium. Systems as such, learn to 
understand the reality of the environment to reach its 
goals. However, rules change in an evolutionary 
process brought about by the interaction of a system 
with the environment, so as do goals whilst in the 
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interim, affect agent’s behavioral causality which is a 
function of time. To consider pragmatically, there is a 
definite interrelationship between intention and 
behavior which relates actions to the effective 
behavior of a system. To consider analogically, goals 
in animals related to the obtaining of food, care of the 
body and offspring(s), repulsion of a predator, their 
nesting behavior and their mating behavior are all 
considered to be their innate behavior which have 
tended to remain little affected as a  consequence of 
evolutionary process. However, it is difficult to 
ascertain whether tool-using behavior in non-human 
animals is a purely innate behavior or evidence of 
learning and intelligence (Goodall 1970). If that is the 
case of a result of learning, then one may conclude 
that evolution have a net positive effect on agent(s) 
behavior as a corollary to adaptation which is a state 
of homeostasis, explicitly to quote, only when 
homeostatic environment is reached, adaptation is 
possible.  
B. Neurophysiologic Basis of Behavioral 
Actions: Cognitive System 
Behavior may be expressed as a series of 
movements and postures on account of continuous 
stream of effector events (Bently & Konishi, 1978). 
Behavior actions are as such collection of reactive 
patterns which are triggered by a specific external 
and/or internal stimulus. Then, to consider in terms of 
neurobiological basis, all sorts of agent behavioral 
actions are motor in nature modulated by sensory 
feedbacks to the central patterns. Patterns imply 
order. This is similar to understanding the basis of 
neural patterns at the cellular level for control of 
behavior. The neurobehavioral basis of patterns of 
movement is composed of postures, rhythmically 
repeated movements or an episodic movement which 
is founded on the theory of central pattern generation 
as a general feature of all rhythmical behaviors where 
invariant repetitions of patterns lead to specific 
activation of response systems. As such, two 
interdependent systems may be identified; one is 
representative (pattern generation) and the other- 
functional (neural).Behavioral system thus may be 
classified into two diverse components- Cognitive 
science and neuroscience. While the first is based on 
reasoning, logic application (mind-in-motion) and 
artificial intelligence development equally applicable 
in computer sciences, the later represents a more 
functionally applied form of the former. While 
analyzing human behavioral system, it is uniformly 
important to understand the underlying control (both 
biosynthetic and analytic) theory that links the former 
with the later. Since all actions are motor actions, 
determinants of the sequence of motor patterns and 
factors that precipitates activation of a motor pattern 
depends on the mechanisms that analyze sensory 
inputs (see textbox 1. in the appendix).  
     During the 1970’s, D.J. McFarland and others 
have analyzed several aspects of the neurobiological 
regulatory systems to understand the constancy 
(homeostatic) of the internal environment and to 
establish behavioral links in homeostatic 
mechanisms. In his seminal paper, McFarland (1970) 
shaped the mathematical analogy of motivational 
systems, a concept envisioned from motivational 
energy theory of Hinde (1960). R.A. Hinde’s (1960) 
energy models of motivation laid the modern 
foundation of behavioral energetic where he 
introduced motivational state and the biopotential 
energy concept. The background was to understand 
transfer function determination of sensory receptors, 
where it is essential to take into consideration the 
energy-transfer models of a system. The brain is 
considered to be the most active functional unit of a 
human body or an animal. It is the origin of the central 
pattern system that analyzes sensory inputs and 
directs motor actions.  Human beings as well as 
animals expend substantial amount of energy for both 
motor actions and to obtain information. For human 
beings, this is in the form of motivational energy. 
Within the brain, there undergoes massive amount of 
energy transformation, dissipation and conservation 
of potential energy and it is vaguely difficult to map 
such total energy content of a fully developed human 
brain, let aside energy mapping and energy 
transductions. This is the subject matter of behavioral 
neuroenergetics which may be provisioned in the 
future course of research related to total brain energy 
mapping in human and primate species to decipher 
comparative neural energy expenditures in these two 
species. To be content with the present context of 
cognitive neuroeconomics, I may quote that 
motivation is required to obtain information and it is 
different from stimulus. Then if behavior is considered 
a function of time based on trials in learning abilities, 
[6] 
 
it might be probable to quantify predictions (without 
precision) about potential behavior and physiology of 
a system based on what the system has learned. 
These energy models of information acquirement is 
based on Brillouin’s (1962) negentropy (negative 
entropy)principle of information which he derived from 
the Second Law of Thermodynamics (	
 
 ) where entropy is a measure of the 
availability for work of the order within a given 
system. In the generalization of Carnot’s principle, 
work required to obtain information and the price paid 
in increase of entropy  information which is gained. 
To provide an alternate definition of the term entropy 
as a measure of disorder of a system or randomness, 
a completely random dispersion of elements 
corresponds to maximum entropy, or minimum 
information. McFarland has drawn an example of 
temperature regulatory system of camels related to 
water conservation to show the relational 
characteristics between entropy and energy. In 
camels, energy dissipation occurs during water 
conservation. Conservation of water through the 
reduction of water loss through evaporation results in 
reduced heat loss and thus, body temperature rises. 
This means, camels are adapted to arid desert 
conditions to minimize sweating. Their fine woolly 
hide insulates the body, reducing heat gain. The 
camel can also allow its body temperature to rise to 
41 °C (106 °F) before sweating at all due to presence 
of unique protein chaperones which do not unfold 
under heat stress. This reduces the temperature 
difference between the camel and its environment 
and thereby reduces heat gain and water loss by as 
much as two-thirds. It tolerates extreme dehydration 
and can lose up to 25–30 percent of its body weight—
twice what would be fatal for most mammals. Owing 
to the peculiar nature of their red blood cell 
membranes which are viscous that permits swelling 
which prevent their RBCs from bursting under 
osmotic stress is the reason why they are less 
dehydrated. Also, camels are able to store large 
amounts of fat forming humps. In times of crisis, they 
expend this fat in the form of heat energy which is 
dissipated universally over their body. On account of 
their thick skin coat, they do not sweat and hence 
their body temperature rises, conserving water while 
using heat as a function of entropy. This is an 
example of physiological type of motivation- induced 
adaptation for survival in animals. Comparatively, if I 
define the concept of motivation as ‘a continual 
psychological process that drives an individual or an 
agent to accomplish goal oriented actions in 
achieving individual potential to fulfill their existential 
needs and’, then, motivational energy is the force of 
power of a stimulus that transforms the embedded 
potential energy in the agent into useful and 
intentional energy. 
C. Simplifying Teleological Process:  
Teleological learning process is primarily based on 
the notion of innovation where human rationality and 
designs of inquest can achieve their definitive 
purpose of discovering and identifying universal 
truths. It is thus an intentional, goal oriented learning 
process. Teleological process still remains a 
questionable status under foundations of 
epistemological principles. Any change set to take 
place in an organization must be based on the notion 
of goal defined by some definite process. This is to 
say that there should be some definite benefit of 
adopting a process to know beforehand what its 
outcomes could be like, even under most probabilistic 
terms of sense. However, the indemnity of favorable 
outcomes cannot be certain, since, it is practically 
difficult to define precisely general equilibrium in 
nature. As Laplace once stated that if one has all the 
complete data about present system, it would be 
possible to predict the entire future. Nevertheless, a 
process should help determine and achieve goals if 
goals fail to define some ultimate process, 
conversely, goals should help modify a process if that 
learning process fails to determine or achieve goals. 
David Cayla (2008) in his inspiring paper states the 
lack of either one of the above complementary forces 
of change (goal and process) in both under 
equilibrium conception and under adaptation, and 
where, there subsists either goal without process 
(former) or process without goals (in the later). In this 
title, I provide a simple model to fill this gap between 
both teleological learning process and ateleological 
processes to interpret on the basis of agent behavior 
that how one may possibly determine the directional 
component or trajectory of the other. In the course, 
what I have attempted is to interpret the correct 
representation of the underlying principles of 
teleology, albeit, in terms of adaptive economics. 
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    Systems behavior (h) is affected by environment 
(Ei) with both endogenous and exogenous factors 
being at occupation.  A system’s evaluation of the 
relation between its intentions and its behavior is 
determined by the stability of representations and 
perceptions that determines the behavior of the 
cognitive system. This stability of representations and 
perceptions are brought about by some permanent 
changes induced by learning (l) where rules (Rt+1) 
stay in equilibrium (∆e as long as the cognitive 
system (C) is unchanged. If the rules (Rt+1) are 
changed contemporaneously, under unbounded 
rationality|B|, it would be difficult to ascertain the 
outcomes (δ of a learning process. That is to say, 
that a system which is in dynamic process where 
rules that direct a process do not change but is ex 
ante determined, it is compatible with the notion of 
intention where learning system is limited inside a 
certain path. Here, the changes in agent behavior are 
stable which has a definite trajectory, i.e. v. 
Teleological process on the contrary is a dynamic 
equilibrium process which shifts away from the notion 
of stability of the rules which are determined 
endogenously. A teleological process may express 
some diverse moves in an unknown environment 
where actions determine path trajectoryv of a 
learning process with heterogenic agent behavior and 
are affected by the changes in system’s intentions. 
This is evident from the point of view that changes in 
agent’s behavior determine evolutionary processes 
which are governed by bounded rationality under 
classical dynamic equilibrium. Reciprocally, 
environmental factors also impact agent’s behavior 
during the course of the evolutionary process. To 
quote without difficulty, teleological process rests on 
some unbounded rationality principle. This is the 
reason behind how differential perceptions impact 
actions of different people under similar 
circumstances encircling same objectives, similar 
environment and comparable cognitive limitations. 
Civically, this is the reason why two communities may 
act differently in the face of a same disturbance in 
their environment. And this is the reason why cultures 
differ enormously across the world under the realms 
of biocultural evolution which stems from the fact that 
how they ‘train their young?’ Uncertainty of the 
knowledge creation process thus renders it more 
difficult in understanding the finalities of learning 
process under unstable rules. But again, it is difficult 
to predetermine the actions Aof heterogenic agents 
(h, .." when they do not follow dynamic equilibrium. 
Hence, it is important to integrate agents’ subjective 
dimensions under teleological process. To achieve 
goals, one needs to perform certain actions, and 
these actions follow certain procedures or process. 
However, the path dynamicity of the process 
trajectory may change in course of evolution to 
achieve a specific goal. Thus in organizations, 
conscientious managerial decisions are often 
bounded by specific strategies related to a specific 
goal where managerial behavior tends to be an 
adaptive process that occurs in response to a change 
in the environment (goals). If the goals (actions) 
change, it must be followed by some degree of 
homogenous change in actions (but not goals). So, 
change in actions induces changes in reactions, 
since, action is needed for perception which is 
required to achieve goal. But the question remain, in 
order to avoid chaos in evolutionary process, what 
specific actions may be required to achieve specific 
goals under stable (unstable) environment with 
homogenous (heterogeneous) agents within 
(un)bounded rationality, or, contained by irrational 
boundaries? I may posit here that for the later query, 
teleological process play some dominant role whilst 
for the former, it may be possibly conceived that the 
classical dynamic equilibrium process may apply. 
There remains subjective argument of whether 
change in actions help attain similar goals with 
dissimilar reactions. Learning as such, is a basis for 
the process of change in organizational behavior, and 
where, system of innovation in learning induces 
innovations in organizational behavior. Organizational 
adaption then is both a dynamic equilibrium process 
as well as teleological process where its trajectory 
when founded on a cognitive system of unbounded 
learning process, is difficult to predict. This is 
because the finalities of a learning process under 
teleological principles are difficult to determine. 
However, under stable agent behavior with bounded 
rationality, which is a dynamic equilibrium process 
(guided process), path trajectories may be fixed and 
where outcomes may be discernible.  Under 
decentralized process of learning in an organization, 
a team often adapts its collective behavior when it is 
confronted by new rules that come from the 
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management. Adaptive behavior of the team is then 
particularly oriented to the new rules as specified with 
new goals that demand differential actions dissimilar 
from the prior rules laid down by the management.    
This may encourage one to undertake a time-
dependent study of organizational behavior of how 
they continuously change and evolve through both 
adaptive process and guided process by analyzing 
the nature of routines to implement in order to follow 
rules. These events account for the important role of 
changes in collective intentions of the team in the way 
organizations adapt to a change in their environment. 
Hence, leadership development is essential which 
sets routines to be implemented and rules to be 
followed to achieve goals and actions to be 
performed by teams in order to reach targets. 
3. The Model 
In this section, I lay down the basic framework for a 
simple model of a more complex structure of order to 
test the qualitative aspects of the explanatory factors 
of behavioral process related to organizational 
adaptation. To understand how organizations change 
and why they need to adapt, this model simplifies 
both the teleological aspects of Cayla’s (2008) 
presentation as well the trajectory of the behavioral 
and the neuroeconomics of learning process under 
equilibrium. This model thus both subjectively and 
objectively, correlates to the functions of human 
elements in industry and under organizational 
structures. Since understanding organizational 
behavior is to understand the business goals and 
philosophies of top executives in a particular 
organization, the reason behind differential 
personalities and business organizational dispositions 
of any individual company or unit is due to differences 
in reflections of its top management. However, by 
keeping aside individual dispositions at the bay, the 
top management de-differentiates their personal traits 
and grounds on some common goals that sets 
organizational growth trajectory.  This is because in 
an organizational unit, the rules are laid down by the 
top management executives who provide vision, and 
the rules are set to be followed by their immediate 
subordinates down to each individual team members 
to reach the same. For if, there are chaos in the top 
management, this would leave the agents with none 
but, unconstrained, unfocussed and non-directional 
perturbations. For that reason, understanding 
corporate organizational objectives is equivalent to 
perceiving the top management’s vision which is, by 
far, as important as understanding the dynamics of 
employee behavior under cluster settings. Herein per 
se, I present a simple mathematical model to 
construe some practical issues related to 
organizational adaptation through learning.  
     Before presenting the model, I set forward some 
subtle queries related to behavioral adaption process 
of learning that may be mathematically deduced, and 
which I have discussed in subsection A under section 
II. Under organizational setup, Cardona et. al., (2003) 
have stressed on two types of learning; calculative 
learning and evaluative learning. In this paper, we 
shall mostly deal with the later, i.e. the organizational 
implications of evaluative learning.  Answers to these 
queries will help me to fill some of the missing 
information on the subject. These are, but not limited 
to; 
• How agent’s behavior is modified, why and 
when? 
• What factors determine trajectory of a 
learning process? 
• Does trajectory modify the outcome of a 
learning process? 
• How change in rules impact agent behavior 
and the trajectory? 
• When do rules need to change and why do 
they need to change? 
    Responses to these queries are directly related to 
any organizational setting wherein, one may be able 
to theoretically offer certain propositions in relation to 
organizational behavior heterogeneity and 
adaptation. The equation that I propose from the 
variables described in the above section stands as; 
                                    
{ } ( )1( )i k tjv E C A l h B i R es λ + = + ∆ 


    (1)  
   Where, the variables are defined as, # for 
trajectory, $ for outcome, % signifying bounded 
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constraints, &' denotes evolutionary process, ( 
indicates the system, |)| signifying actions, * and / 
subsequently implies the learning process and 
homogenous agent behavior (which is a function of 
time), |0|1 containing the bounded rationality, and 234  stands for rules which are time (in)variant. I 
place a constant 56 followed by the equilibrium of the 
system ∆. The equation holds well when all other 
things remaining constant. The variable % is trivial and 
removing it when solving will not modify the overall 
equation, but it has important implications in the later 
part. One can solve for all the implied variables to 
derive equation functions, but I content here with 
three major variables which would likely resolve the 
above postulates. First, I need to prove whether 
change in trajectory # would induce changes in 
homogenous agent’s behavior which is, / and, 
under what conditions the trajectory would change.   
Definition 1   Trajectory will only tend to change 
when rules change which may induce change in 
agent’s behavior where (# 7 2 7 / that is, agent’s 
behavior will change proportionately to the change in 
trajectory that is the effect of  proportionate change in 
rules, where #  2 8 0  or R: 0 so that any change 
in rules will be absorbed. Under stable conditions, the 
agents have no preferences. 
This definition leads us to:  
Lemma 1   Let ‘/’ be the agent behavior and # a 
function of trajectory and where ‘*’ be the learning 
process.  We need to solve for agent’s behavior from 
(1) where we need to prove that; 
                          /  # ; or, /  # 7 *               (2) 
Proof.  See Appendix  <     
To consider empirically what may induce changes in 
the learning process and how it may modify agent 
behavior independent of the outcomes to bring on 
changes in the trajectory, it is important to emphasize 
the role of actions performed by agents which modify 
trajectory. Actions performed by agents may be 
positive or non-neutral whereas, the same may be 
said of outcomes.   
Proposition 1     Agents behavior to hold good with 
the learning process that may be modified by 
outcome, which may again be, positive or non-
neutral. To propose that agent’s behavioral change 
may induce equivocal changes in the learning 
process ‘l’ where, outcome is non extensive and may 
be difficult to determine.  
(i)oUnder constraint, if / = 0, then agents actions 
are one of the following; |)| > 0, may be |)| = 0, |)|  0 
 ?@ A $	@	5@
. 
(ii) Under constraint, if /  0, then agents actions 
are |)| B 0, or even may  be |)|  0 but, may not 
be|)| = 0.  
   Let us consider an organization under teleological 
process of adaptation which is a fast moving, 
dynamic and headed by some strong, motivated 
management experts who have some positive vision 
to move the organization up the corporate value 
chain. To achieve efficiency in organizational 
operations, directional disciplines are imposed with 
rules laid down by these top executives.  Now, 
consider an environment where the company faces 
some constraints in its businesses related to a 
downturn, market hyper-competitiveness or cost 
pressure or, the combination of all of the above three. 
Again, consider the same company when it has 
procured a large contract from another partner firm or 
government, other things remaining constant. Now, 
the company needs to reorient itself for a new 
equilibrium where there are new goals or new targets 
to meet, and new challenges to overcome with 
unknown externalities. As a consequence, the CEO 
with the help of Board of Directors (BoD) and top 
executives will lay down new sets of rules based on 
new routines to be followed. Now, there are three 
options left for the agents (employees). They should 
follow the new rules with positive actions, cede to the 
imposed constraint or do nothing (where,|A|  0). 
Hence, under such constraints of new rules, their 
behavior /must change which will reflect in their 
actions|)| B 0, and which must be positive B 1 for the 
organization to sustain, since, the rules (R) are now 
changed. Thereafter, they will have to adapt to these 
new equilibrium which would call for new knowledge 
acquisition, technology adoption and innovation in the 
learning process. As such, there will be some 
inadvertent change in the learning process. In the first 
case, the goals remain unchanged, only firm specific 
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changes are required to meet the same target(s). 
However, in the second case, goals and targets both 
change. To be noted here, one may find similar 
constraints in both these cases where, they call for 
changes in agent behavior/ and purposefully in 
their actions|)|. 
Proof.   Under bounded constraints, agent’s behavior 
needs to change, but it is also the last to undergo 
such adaptation. I need to evaluate what if the rules 
(R) change by reducing the equation (1) and solving 
for R. 
                                   
{ } ( )1( )i k tjv E C A l h B i R es + − = + ∆ 

        (3)                                     
Opening commonalities of the groups (parenthesis), 
one derives 
                                              
1
( )
i k tj
v
E C A l h B i R e
s
+= +

              (4)                                                  
Where,  
                       
1 1i k t i k tj j
v sE C A B i R el sE C A B i R eh+ += +
  
  (5)     
Where, outcome will tend to modify the system’s 
adaptation with the environment as a product of 
actions under dynamic equilibrium that will define 
the path trajectory, and where again, agent’s 
behavior may change or remain bounded. Then, 
rules will be defined by, 
                    
( )1 1 1t i k t i k tj jv R sEC A B i R el sEC A B i R eh+ + += + 
 (6)                                   
    Where, 234  is a function of the cumulative 
proportionate measure of the dependent variable 
trajectory divide by the sum of all the variables; 
which signify rules will moderate all other 
variables and will tend to determine #   
    ( )1 1 11 1t i k t i k tj ji k t i k tj j
R sE C A B i R el sE C A B i R eh
sE C A B i R el sE C A B i R eh
+ + +
+ +
+
+
 
  
1 1i k t i k tj j
v
sE C A B i R e l s E C A B i R eh+ ++
 
        (7) 
  Hence, rules will impact the trajectory 
determined by other externalities under 
equilibrium where outcome is a product of all 
other entities. Thus, if rules change, the trajectory 
will also tend to change which will be influenced 
by the product of outcome and all other 
determinants (actions, behavior, learning etc.). 
Reducing the equation, I derive                                                                                              
                                                  
1 / ( )t i kjR v sE C A B i e l h+ = +

      (8) 
For further Proof, See Appendix  <   
      Also, rules will remain stable as long as the 
trajectory remains unaffected, determined by 
outcome, learning process and agent behavior. If 
however, the agent behavior turns negative 
indefinite / = 0 with infertile actions|)| D 0, then 
the particular management will try in its best effort 
to impose further limiting constraints on the 
agents (///%Fto streamline their actions through 
training, counseling, reorientation programs and 
forewarnings, following which, for incumbent 
agents who continue with their poor performance 
and marginal productivity, and who do not meet 
these criteria even after appropriate 
reconditioning, possibility of layoffs may be in the 
line. Good managers who know how to manage 
themselves usually provide context of values 
within which agents can manage themselves and 
thus thrive to neutralize the effects of imposed 
constraints. 
   Let us then examine the effect of limiting 
constraints imposed by the management on the 
agents would likely modify rules as well as the 
trajectory. The equation I may write after 
adjusting for (#  #, 
                           234  #/$//%F                    (9)                                                        
Initial first derivation of %F is      
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                           $%F234  #/                        (9.1)                                                            
                                                          
2
1
1 1
t
t t
s R vh
sR sR
λ +
+ +
=
                     (9.2)                                                            
Where,  
                        
2
1t
vh
sR
λ
+
=
                            (9.3)                                                             
     Initially,%F  GHIJKL, where, the degree of 
imposed constrained will be equal to the product 
of the trajectory and agent behavior influenced by 
outcome and rules where outcome and rules will 
modify both trajectory and agent behavior 
following 234  #/$ HMN, where, rules will be 
directed by the product of the ratio of #/$ on the 
degree of agent responsiveness to the imposed 
constraints. Herein now, the rules are bound to 
be changed since the agents will have to bear the 
combined impact of all the other modifiers (9.7). 
   From the first equation (1), the generalized 
constraint % is common for all the variables where 
it implies conditional restrictions related to 
environmental externalities, system’s constraints, 
and the management imposed constraints, et 
cetera following in (9) where I have increased the 
exponential power of %4 by%434OF. The rationality 
behind this is the synthetic constraints being 
imposed by the management on the part of the 
agents. However, %Pis not desirable since it may 
amend to commanding nature of organizational 
practice and may awfully turn the corporate 
ambience into dictatorial administration which 
may induce definite negative Q/ behavioral 
changes in agents with positive intentions for 
turnover. This is an interesting pursuit in order to 
understand the employee-management behavior 
cycle in an organizational setup. It is noteworthy 
to mention here that the degree of synthetic 
constraint%F imposed on the agents however, will 
be adjusted as a new equilibrium, where any 
such diminution in % on the part of the agents is 
undesirable, since, %F cannot further reduce to % 
which may compromise operational efficiency. 
So, for the new incoming agents the, equation (1) 
is to hold again. Per se, after the rules are set 
and the incumbent agents adjust to%F, any 
competent management should motivate the 
team by leading through inspiration and 
persuasion rather than by command. Now, 
isolating the variables by exponentiation of both 
sides by the reciprocal of the variable’s exponent, 
one derives (9.6) through (9.4).  
                                                                
1 1
2 2
1 1
2 2
v h
s R
λ =
                     (9.4)                                                         
Thereof,   
                         
1 1
2 2
1 1
2 2
v h
s R
λ = −
                      (9.5)                                                          
Where, R S	@5$ 	/ $	 #@
5@A*$ T %                                                             
                                                 
1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2
1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2
,
v h v h
s R s R
λ
 
 
=∈ − 
            (9.6)                                                     
Combining (9.3) through (9.6), one may represent 
the equation as; 
 %F  GHIJKL , %  G
LNHLN
LNILN  @U, %  Q G
LNHLN
LNILN   
Where,            % R VGLNHLNLNILN , Q G
LNHLN
LNILNW                     (9.7) 
Substituting for %F, one derive 
                 234  #/$X
Y
Z[ H\]^LN_LN`LNaLNb
N
c
de
4
f                (9.8)                                       
Where,               234  #/$ g _^_IJKL h,   
 234  #/$ iHIJKLGH j and  234  234.             (9.9)  
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    But following 234  GIJKLG  (steps not shown), 
there will be no such behavioral externalities left 
for the agents and thereafter, trajectory will be the 
product function of change in agent behavior and 
outcomes based on new precepts with new 
equilibrium attained as homeostasis is 
established in the remaining agent(s) behavior. 
Hence, a new set of corporate discipline will be in 
place. This justifies why business organizations 
inter-temporarily ‘eject’ some of their employees 
for nonperformance, just to save the countenance 
of other remaining employees and the institution 
itself, where, the course of one incumbent 
threatens the aims and progress of all. Even a 
jackass knows well that non-performance may 
inevitably lead to retrenchment. Hence, 
organizational structure should not make an effort 
to try to continuously adapt itself to the 
idiosyncrasies of job holders whose incumbency 
is insolently transient relative to the long run of 
continuity of the organization. It is on the part of 
the agents who are often required to reorient their 
behavioral dispositions to adapt to the 
organizational routines. Although determining the 
consequences of agent actions ex post is difficult, 
but still, the management should be aware of the 
need to adapt to other idiosyncrasies, i.e., 
attrition and voluntary renouncing of employment. 
There seems to be many factors, but one primary 
cause behind attrition may be attributed to 
employee over-performance and their 
underrepresentation by the management. 
Sustained undervaluation of over-performing 
employees may induce negative changes in 
agent behavior / = 0 and may result in 
asymptotic agent underperformance|)| = 0 
(where, |)| 7 ∆/ k lm 0 that may invite 
countercyclical layoffs, which again, satisfies 
equation 8. Insofar since|)| n / R o and in such, 
let p R |)| while  R / are in relation q, then, I 
may write pq that is, pq r p,  R q s |)| t /. 
Hence, it is the responsibility of the management 
to maintain such balancing act of understanding 
agent behavioral externalities sandwiched 
between performance appraisals and 
performance breakdown to preserve vibrancy of 
organizational ambience. It shall be valued herein 
that human agents are able to draw inspirations 
from uncountable sources of stimuli (which is of 
prime nature), i.e. from rational behavior and 
achievements of their immediate neighbors, 
reading, historical events, from grief or sorrow, 
happiness or even from motion pictures. If the 
agents are suitably motivated through 
constructive communications, encouragement, 
and inspirations, they may accomplish wonders. 
Here lies the importance of Hinde’s (1960) 
motivational energy concept wherein, inspirations 
drawn from stimuli may motivate agents 
profoundly, and where the management’s ability 
to motivate it’s agents to reach organizational 
goals should be well accounted for. This is also 
the reason for which organizations tend to hire 
experienced agents who have extensive history 
of transactions with the environment on account 
of prior social exposures wherein, consequences 
of errors in agent’s responses are minimized. 
While for the novices, greenhorn and tenderfoots, 
organizations undertake extensive training 
programs incorporating into the agents’ own 
behavior repertoires the learned adaptive 
behavior of more experienced agents through 
less cumbersome processes. However otherwise, 
the individual agents would then have to be 
required to discover by themselves the existence 
of novel distribution of important elements in the 
environment, which can be a protracted process 
(H.B. Maynard). 
Proposition 2     Agent’s behavior must change 
when there is no favorable outcome with a well 
determined trajectory, i.e., when #  $ . But even 
if the outcome is discounted, there must take 
place a concurrent change in the learning 
process. 
Proof.   Let us consider learning as a stationary 
process where, u'  v and w'  
	/@*5xU #@
5@	$, then, we will be 
able to derive Gram-Schmidt’s orthonormalization 
of a variate say, x' where,  Δzx'  u' (Δz difference operator and u'  $	@	5@
 
S$$). 
To prove that agent behavior may change 
bounded by stationarity of the learning process, I 
have modified the equation somewhat to suit the 
objectives. The equation may be written as; 
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                                      x'  *                          (10)                                                                   
Let us substitute x'by #/$ to be able to prove that 
trajectory is a function of learning and outcome.  
Again, substituting x' by (1), 
{ } ( )1( )i k tjE C A l h B i R e+ + 

 ,  
The equation reads as; 
                                          
{ } ( )1/ ( )i k tjv sE C A l h B i R e l+ + = 

 (11)                                                                
Solving for *, we get, 
                                                                    #/s&'(|)|/|0|156234= *       (12)                                                  
Where,  
                         1i k tjvE C A h B i R es +

 *    (13) 
  To quote, learning will be modified by all other 
variates and indirectly modified by outcome which 
will further determine the path trajectory and 
rationality of agent behavior. This may be 
obtained by solving for #(not shown). Here, 
learning may not directly determine the outcome 
if rules that lead to learning are not structured 
then, learning may not lead to favorable outcome. 
Whereof learning is assigned to be some non-
stationary process, under circumstances of 
generality, * will be affected by *  itself as well as 
by all other variables. Thus to infer that learning 
process should never remain stationary but will 
bring innovations in learning by self-evaluation, 
where, by solving for #, one derives *  * 7 ∆*. 
Perhaps, this is the most universal part of our 
theory and holds true even in the practical and 
day to day lives of every individual person on 
earth, among animals, as well for organizations. 
On examining the gene specific effects of 
learning on agent behavior however, it would be 
interesting to presume that how learning 
influence gene activation and gene expression or 
whether do learning suppress an agent’s innate 
behavior or help express it. A probable 
assumption may be that more intense learning 
reflect less of an individual’s innate behavior in 
the course of more gene activation, memory 
development and vice versa. 
     So, learning positively influences adaptive 
behavior although, there are certain behaviors 
that are not changed by the learning process, an 
example being the case of behavior in 
‘Drosophila mutant’. To draw a simple analogy to 
posit that human actions in the form of agent 
behavior tend to be rationally adaptive (due to 
learning) than most of her peer neighbors 
(primates), since, human beings are able to 
spend most of their time doing some work, or at 
any rate, something in particular (Elton 1927) in 
contrast to animals: I quote a phrase from Berry’s 
paper (1989) what Elton characterized animal 
behavior as,  
--‘Animals spend an unexpectedly large 
amount of their time doing nothing at all, 
or at any rate nothing in particular...[They] 
are not always struggling for existence.’ 
     In what retrospect Elton meant that animals 
seldom do useful work, in a sense, stimulates 
one about thinking the notion of ‘animal capital’ in 
congruence with human capital. From the dawn 
of the civilization, man and woman domesticated 
wild animals and used their physical energy 
reserves for her various purposes. But the facts 
that animals can reason and learn have opened a 
new chapter in understanding their behavior and 
interaction with the environment. Classic work by 
Romanes (1881) who studied comparative 
psychology in his book ‘Animal Intelligence’, and 
recent accounts by Griffin, ‘The Question of 
animal awareness’ (1976) and on animal thinking 
(1984) provide excellent insights into the minds of 
animals of whether they have intentional states. 
Fodor (1975) theory of evolutionary origin for the 
representational system also provides excellent 
analytical discourse of referential opacity, 
existential generalization and intentionality states. 
The fact that the human brain excels at finding 
patterns even among random data represents the 
reflective acts as the principle objects of our 
reasoning, since; it is the inherent nature of 
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human to believe by reasoning, by throwing out 
questions on propositional attitudes, and 
applications of decision, strategy, evaluation and 
rule use. It is of interest to recognize from the 
behavioral ethologists’ viewpoint whether animals 
possess similar kinds of concealed awareness or 
attitudes, and when if appropriately stimulated or 
motivated, do they be able to show such 
representations of reasoning, conation and 
discrimination? If cognition is depended on 
language, and here I am speaking about animal 
consciousness, then reversing of what Elton 
(1927) meant would lead to a deeper 
understanding of mental experiences in animals 
(Griffin 1976). I shall now illustrate a simple 
scenario to exemplify the role that evaluative 
learning plays in modifying biological elements of 
agent’s behavioral environment.     
SCENARIO  1.     Let us consider a scenario 
involving three different generations (0th, 1st and 
2nd generations) of agent behavior and analyze 
how learning will affect gene expression and 
agent performance in the first and second 
generations respectively. Consider in the zeroth 
generation, agents are tenderfoots, in the 1st 
generation, they are learners whilst in the second 
generation they are proficiently expert. 
Definition 2     Continued higher learning will 
induce gene activation and expression in agents 
in the first generation which will reflect less of the 
agent’s inherent behavior while more of  adaptive 
behavior, and vice versa, as a consequence of 
“zeroth” generation impact, where, it is assumed 
that agents are tenderfoots in the “zeroth” 
generation . 
This definition leads us to: 
Lemma 2        Let (*F) be defined as learning 
where ‘’ is the gene expression factor, oand o 
be social transmission and social exposure 
factors and let /' , / be defined as innate 
(inherent) and adaptive behavior respectively. 
Then, we need to solve for  to prove that 
learning (*F) induces gene expression in the first 
generation where, 
2 / ( )i e t
a
h
l s s
h
ω
 
= + 
 
               (14) 
Proof.  From (14), it is possible to derive the 
learning-gene expression cycle of agents and to 
further prove that (i) gene expression will be more 
determined by learning and less by innate 
behavior and, (ii) learning induces gene 
expression in the first generation. By solving for  
to derive the notion that  7 1//' (in the first 
generation), as it continues; 
                                                       
( )2a e t
i
h l s s
h
ω
+
=
            (14.1)  
For further Proof, See Appendix  <   
   Therefore, in the first generation, gene 
expressions will be directed relative to the 
adaptive behavior influenced by learning and 
where,  is inversely correlated to the expression 
of innate behavior in the agents. Hence, there will 
be less of expressions in individual’s innate 
behavior when compared to more expressions of 
an agent’s adaptive behavior acquired through 
learning, as also, the gene expressions will be 
influenced by both social exposure and social 
transmission which will have a propensity to 
determine the outcomes of the second 
generation. 
Proposition 3       It is important to prove the 
relationship holdings between learning and gene 
expression effects and whether in the “2nd” 
generation, that is, for proficient agents, how the 
equation holds provided that the genetic effects in 
the first generation is inversely related to innate 
behavior as an effect of learning. It may hold here 
that in the second generation of agents, innate 
behavior acquired from the previous experiences 
of the first generation will be expressed which will 
further aid in better learning and exposition of 
acquired behavior. This is the reason for which I 
represent this as the ‘agent learning-gene 
expression-behavior cycle’. 
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Proof.        From (14.1) in the first generation,  
is inversely related to hi as outcome of learning. 
Now in the second generation, it is important to 
exemplify how first generation effects would 
impact agent behavior in the second generation 
and establish the cyclical behavior of learning, 
gene expression and behavioral representation in 
agents. As illustrated by solving for hi , innate 
behavior will be expressed as further aid in better 
learning and exposition of acquired behavior in 
the second generation but if,  
                                                       
2 2
i a e a th h l S h l sω = +                 (14.2)                                                          
Then,   
                                                                                                                                
( )2a e t
i
h l S s
h
ω
+
=
                     (14.3)                                                  
   Wherein, in (14.3), although hi directly relates to 
the expression of acquired-adaptive behavior of 
the agent, it seems a problem of inverse relation 
to gene effect. Here, let /=/.This particularity 
may be attributed to the fact that in the second 
generation, the role of gene effect on innate 
behavioral expression is less exposited than the 
effect of innate behavior which will help express 
more of an agent’s acquired behavior and further 
aid in learning. Thus, there will be some effect of 
acquired changes in an agent’s innate behavior 
permanently through learning. This is proved by 
(14.7) where, it satisfies the proposition 3. But 
again, we require *=/'  or /'(x) =* so, (14.3) will 
not satisfy. Hence, I modify the equation (14.3) 
slightly as; 
                                                          
( )
( ) ( )( )
( )
2
x
e t
i e t
l S S
x
x h S S
+
=
 + 
∫
              (14.4)                                                               
                                                               
( ) ( )
( )
2 bh
e t
b
b i e t
l S S
h
h h S S
ω
ω
ω
+
=
+∫
           (14.5)                                                              
And,  
                                                            
2
( )
bh
b
b i
l
h
h h
ω
ω
ω
=∫
                         (14.6)                                                                 
Now using linear rational polynomial function and  
solving for *2,  
 
2
( )
bh
b
b i
l
h
h h
ω
ω
ω
=
                      (14.7)                                                                 
we get, 
                    
1 1 1
2b b bh h h
b il w h h
ω ω ω=
   
Where,  
1 1
b bh h
bx w h
ω ω
 
 
=

   
 or,  
                 
( )
1
hb
bx wh
ω
=
 and thus, we derive 
                                                                           
1
2 ( )bhih xl
ω=
                  (14.8)  
   However, the gene effect may modify acquired 
behavior and learning to some extent in the 
second generation and the agents will tend to 
adapt to the new equilibrium with more memory 
development in their third generation due to the 
positive effect of learning on innate behavior. 
Here, (x) is significant because, learning will 
impact all the variables from 3
rd
 generation 
onwards resulting in gene expression. It should 
be noted that that all the derivations satisfy 
equation (1), the primary equation of the model. 
Recent evidence suggests the fact that 
neuroplastic mechanisms required for memory 
consolidation process is a gene expression 
dependent process through expression of specific 
immediate-early genes (IEGs) which have 
differential stimulus thresholds for transcriptional 
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induction (Abraham et al., 1993). One class of 
IEG, Arc plays a critical role in synaptic plasticity 
through interactions with other structural proteins 
such as calcium calmodulin- dependent Kinnase 
II (CaMK II). CaMK II is a dendritic protein 
required for long tem memory formation. Arc RNA 
expression is regulated by patterned stimulation 
that induces long term potentiation. M. Dragunow 
(1996) also established the role of immediate-
early transcription factors in learning and 
memory. It is thus evident that stimulus induced 
by learning or behavioral training induce gene 
expression leading to memory development.  
4. Organizational applicability of the 
Model 
I have outlined the exploratory behavioral issues 
confronting agents under organizational 
surrounding by developing a simple model. The 
above outlined model specifications although 
have certain limitations since it does not 
incorporate all the events that take place in an 
organization, neither it is feasible to design a 
comprehensive model containing all the events 
that designate a general equilibrium in nature. 
The real implications that can be drawn lie in 
understanding the heterocyclic behavior of agent 
actions with recuperative response analysis of 
the management in lieu of such actions. When 
agents are part of an organization, they are 
bounded by certain internalities of the work 
processes related to the organization’s goals. 
Agents then measure the total marginal efficiency 
of being in that job of what collateral benefits that 
they can draw upon, i.e. psychological or 
cognitive benefits.  Here, they are out in the open 
to both social transmission and social exposure 
which impact their behavioral learning. It is also 
true that social exposure modifies their acquired 
behavior while the social transmission of this 
acquired behavior induces alterations (mutations) 
in those agents’ genotype. Then invariably, they 
may contend that what is the real value of a job to 
them on the context of extra-pecuniary benefits? 
To answer this question, it is important to assess 
the applicability of the above model on 
organizations or corporate firms; I would like to 
relate the above dispositions primarily on to two 
general principles of organizational design and 
management. Since organizations are goal 
oriented, their incumbent agents are hence as 
much oriented toward the same ideology as their 
patrons. This is to signify the importance of 
strategic developments in a firm’s bottom-line as 
well as to understand the behavioral dynamics of 
top-line managers or executives. In terms of 
executives, this refers to the ‘value of an 
employee’, whilst, in terms of agents 
(employees), this is but just a ‘value of a job’.  
     However, it also important in terms of agents 
who needs to learn new things to bring on 
innovation in their thought process (and not 
stagnate) in terms of their performance 
integration methodologies and to enhance their 
strategic capabilities under uncertain environment 
and hypercompetitive market forces. Any 
sustained stagflation in agent learning initiatives 
may induce idiosyncratic innovational inactivity 
and may invite countercyclical agent voyages 
where agents may love their organization without 
loving its system! Firms as a consequence, shall 
try to sustain in their initiatives to design, innovate 
and impart new learning processes for their 
agents encircling people skills development 
programs and technology adaptations that might 
help maintain organizational development 
through mutual growth, and thus, leverage their 
agency skills for leadership development. The 
‘real’ value of a job is then beyond some 
pecuniary benefits of what agents might have 
learned in terms of their knowledge, skills and 
adroitness during the course of their job tenure 
which they can leverage in the long run. Hence 
the life-cycle of the raw recruits begins with 
learning and retaining new skills taught to them 
following which, they ought to move up the value 
chain, that is, become experience and proficient. I 
have led some stress on the model for learning 
targeted toward agents which improvably bring in 
permanent changes in their behavior. 
Physiologically, two inferences can be drawn; 
• Continual higher evaluative learning and 
training induces more gene expression 
and transmission of genetic factors 
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• Discontinuous, unstable or learning 
stagflation causes less gene expression 
and less transmission of genetic factors, 
and hence, less adaptive capacity on the 
part of the agents on account of inequity in 
knowledge acquisition 
    That is, social exposure and social 
transmission are important in learning in 
individuals’ as much as adaptive transmission of 
the newly acquired behavior. This would ensure 
positive agent actions in terms of their 
performance metrics with an increased rate of 
adaptation measured as employee productivity as 
a ratio of progress / effort, expected optimal to be B1, which is a function of agent sustainability 
factor. I may hitherto invite a question thereof; is 
it a management responsibility (the agent 
sustainability factor)? Following Berry’s (1989) 
definition of employee productivity, I may derive; 
&   B 1 
   Where, &is employee productivity measured in 
terms of the ratio of progress ( to effort (). 
Organizations would then be able to cut down on 
employee (agent) emigration or migration and 
likewise enhance agent adaptability to the 
environment. However, besides agents, there 
should be enough stress to bring in innovation in 
management learning process since 
managements also qualify as agents of their 
organizations. The benefits of such protracted 
knowledge development through continous 
learning increase a firm’s resource base. This is 
usually achieved in the form of removing 
communication gap between strategic manager 
and the bottom-line through building common 
platforms for resource sharing and strengthening 
interdepartmental communication channels, 
which may vary, according to the differential 
patterns of organizations. 
5. Discussion 
 
It is now necessary to consider a formal 
discussion of several results related to the above 
discourse on the micro-foundations of agent 
behavior and to report the applicability of the 
same that I have proposed. Applying the model of 
teleological design for learning process to 
understand purpose-driven organizational 
adaptation seems plausible in a sense that, 
organizations are goal oriented, and agents 
continuously learn new things as well as they 
require both to adopt new technology and adapt 
to endogenous and exogenous externalities of 
organizational evolutionary process. In the 
process, agents are also exposed to both kinds of 
exogenous natural and endogenous synthetic 
constraints as %434. In lieu of that, I have 
considered both dynamic equilibrium and 
teleological process in congruence. This is 
because learning without adaptation is analogous 
to dispatching a unit to a difficult terrain on the 
war front without requiring them to undergo 
practical analogous preconditioning simulations, 
as also, adaptation is entirely implausible without 
learning and perception (or observational 
experience in animals). Adaptation only occurs 
when a system is required either to survive or to 
derive certain benefits from such and hence has 
to undergo full conditioning to attain homeostasis. 
In the case of an organization, this is brought 
about by learning under institutional settings 
where the information gained by expending 
energy is applied for the benefit of the institution, 
its regulars and its agents. To elucidate more 
transparently the true modifiers of the 
determinants of agent actions and behavior, it 
seems plausible to denote here that motivation is 
a common parameter and time dependent. 
However, stimulus is not synonymous with 
motivation, but a prius quam here. Motivation 
requires prior stimulus which may be in the form 
of efficiency wage effects or enticements. It is a 
well acknowledged fact that incentives motivate 
agents to perform better. By agent actions, here I 
mean purposeful work. In terms of agents, it 
means employment or job. All systems of work 
are energy systems and thus, human work is 
energy directed to goals and targets. Agents put 
in physical and mental energy into producing, 
maintaining or converting economic resources 
into useful commodities (Sahlins 1974). To 
motivate agents for working better, organizations 
from time to time undertake incentive programs 
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where agents are inspired to make the extra 
effort necessary for a better performance by the 
promise of extra reward (Wallman 1980). These 
may be in the form of provision of personal and 
social enticements to work. However and under 
all these circumstances, agents invariably learn 
to work better by adopting new technology while 
adapting to the same and in the way, learning 
about them in turn. Thus, my findings can be 
summarized in the following manner; First and 
foremost, I find that organizations are 
represented by some choices inculpating from 
collective behavioral biases of homogenous 
agents which reflect their trajectory of actions. It 
is apparent from the above generalization that all 
representations of agents and their 
management(s) need to change if the outcome 
remains indefinitely non-positive with 
uncompensated non-directional vector biases. 
Second, it is equally substantiated and shown 
that changes in rules would inevitably lead to 
changes in learning behavior of employees where 
it dynamically influences explicit changes in 
agent’s actions in terms of objective skills 
development. Hence, it would be reasonable for 
the agents to adapt to such state-lines imposed 
by change in rules; employees should understand 
the dynamicity of organizational adaptation in 
relation to their goals; rules and management 
decisions to optimize one’s efficiency in actions in 
order to avoid unfavorable consequences of 
retrenchment. For the organization, it would 
mean to further understand the dynamics of 
agents’ behavioral flexibilities and the sequences 
of information inflow into the system, the need for 
long term changes to be brought in by altering 
intentional dynamism of objective rules, and 
knowledge about trajectory and its outcome 
based on heterogeneity in agent behavioral 
actions. Use of positive stimulus induced 
motivation in terms of learning and innovation in 
the process of learning should be equivocally 
advocated rather than imposing repetitive 
constraints on the part of the agents in order to 
maintain quintessential atmosphere of 
organizational ambience. In the beginning, I have 
mentioned that it is possible for organizations to 
extract meaningful information from 
representational behavior of animals where, I 
have drawn up some comparative literatures 
related to the trial and error based learning 
models in animals and primates that perceptibly 
lead to analogous changes in their social 
behavior. In understanding the fundamental basis 
of the origin of behavior, it is essential to identify 
the factors that decide the specific form of 
behavioral patterns in animals comparative to 
humans. The motivation stems from the fact that 
the fundamental basis of differential intelligence 
among human and the animal kingdom has been 
ascribed to the former’s language learning 
abilities, a feat not observed in the later. 
However, animals also communicate among 
themselves through various ways of 
representations, as in birds through vocalization 
of songs and in insects through acoustic 
communications and organic pheromones. Field 
observation of wild birds living in nature and also 
of captive birds living in semi-natural conditions 
like for example, in song sparrow (Melospiza 
melodia), Chaffinch (Fringilla coelebs) and 
others, experiential proof of existence of 
individual differences in vocal behavior have 
been established. Analysis of frequency spectra 
of bird vocalizations encircling pitch, timbre and 
rhythm from bird calls and songs have revealed 
temporal patterning to identify vocal recognition in 
a single species by its signature tune. An 
example of vocal mimicry in birds that sing have 
variants of songs in their repertoire while, their 
auditory reaction times are faster by ten times 
than they are in human. This is represented by 
antiphonal singing in birds which sing duets 
synchronously in constant time interval that helps 
to maintain their pair bond in a dense habitat of 
foliage. This is also an example of organization of 
bird song where sensory-motor feedback 
coordination for effector activation patterns is 
dependent on auditory feedback of vocal motor 
system which maintains the controlled 
programming of interval patterns and error 
corrections. 
 
    A major difference between human and animal 
behavior is the lack of discipline in animals, but 
they can be trained to attain such discipline to 
some extent, for example, in dogs who can 
acquire discipline through extensive training, but 
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not language learning skills. However, it has been 
assumed that animals do not apply logical rules 
but their behavior can be sometimes rational 
without being logical, although this does not 
establish the relationship between discipline and 
rationality. Monkeys, chimpanzees, pigeons and 
rats all appear to be able to draw transitive 
inferences which children below 5 years of age 
often fail to do so (Russell 1996). As indicative of 
rationality in animals, McGonigle & Chambers 
(1977, 1992) were the first to demonstrate that 
animals are able to draw transitive inferences 
(Monkeys are rational!). However, Gergely & 
Csibra (1996, 1997) provided the evidence that 9-
month old infants can interpret the behavior of an 
abstract computer-animated object as being goal-
directed and can infer its novel action in a 
changed situation as a basis for teleological 
origin of mentalistic action explanations. But there 
are certain exceptions, as in children below the 
age of 5 lacking the working memory capacity for 
holding in mind the mapping of stimuli to more 
than three relations simultaneously (Halford 
1984). Here, animals appear to outperform 
children on ability to make transitive inferences 
and reasoning. This is primarily attributed to the 
temporal differentiation of relative memory 
capacity utilizations in toddlers, animals and adult 
human. Strange to expostulate here in terms of 
memory utilizations that even house lizards 
(gecko, family Gekkonidae) exhibit some form of 
representational memory capacity utilization 
when exposed to Pavlovian conditioning 
(personal observance). Besides these, 
chimpanzees and capuchin monkeys may be 
taught by the use of experimenter-given cues 
during object choice tasks to accede to 
comprehend the associative fashion of 
information. Interesting inferences can be drawn 
regarding current task performance based on 
practice with repetition priming since identifying 
exact nature of representation through repetition 
priming is a memory phenomenon. An example 
of stimulus recognition could be showing a stick 
to a dog as a representation of its memory of any 
past incident of pain inflicted upon. Thus, 
representations underlying the repetition effect 
are domain-specific. This is to infer that animals 
like human possess some degree of social and 
organizational skills that they often call for when 
under severe organic stress. I may posit here that 
there are certain evidences of goal oriented 
behavior found in animals mostly aimed at their 
survival strategy under severe environmental 
stress where they inculpate calculated moves 
organized under rule following behavior and 
where, the cost of an error may prove fatal. 
Analogously, this is all about stress debate (agent 
constraints) where, response of an individual to 
stress and effect of stress that produces 
response under higher levels of functional 
complexity may induce fitness in agents who are 
able to adapt. Environmental constraints or stress 
is, however, an important factor that induces 
competition among agents. The reason behind 
why and how environmental pressure induced 
mass extinction of some species may be ascribed 
to this genetic fitness to counter stress. Thus, in 
terms of fitness concept, the strength of 
competition among agents may be influenced by 
genes which may have positive effects on one 
fitness component and negative ones on another. 
To articulate in such continuum, survivors and 
non-survivors are to be genetically different in 
order to adapt (Berry 1979). One may then 
correctly deduce that a phenotypic property of 
individuals is a product of evolutionary process. 
Here, I may accord that ‘stress’, in its truest 
sense, some imposed externalities of constraint, 
as a form of stimulus under certain circumstances 
provide motivational energy in an organism or an 
agent to achieve its necessary goal, either to 
regulate survival or extract explicit benefits out of 
its habitat. Before concluding this section 
however, I would like to take pride to provide 
some arguments related to the dynamics of 
adaptation process itself by correlating some of 
my findings based on this paper. 
 
     Buoying on this opportunity that I cruise, 
perhaps I could not resist the temptation to 
remark about some aspects related to the past 
explanations of evolution and adaptation put 
down by Jean Baptist Lamarck and Charles 
Darwin way back in the nineteenth century, 
although I am humble enough to put any such 
objective comments on their theoretical 
dispositions as such. However on retrospection, 
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and in order to clear my doubts on the paradigm 
of a dilemma that still haunts the evolutionary 
biologists and paleontologists to this day, and I 
believe that my documented deposition may 
further instigate new lights of debate on these 
topics. On his golden reflections of ‘Natural 
Selection’ eliciting, what was not immoral to 
quote the phrase ‘survival of the fittest’ preceded 
by Lamarck’s hereditable effects of use and 
disuse in ‘Philosophie zoologique’, Charles 
Darwin’s theory had its very own representation 
of the theory of evolution, where I may say that if 
Darwin was correct, and indeed that though he 
was, then, the argument that ‘adaptation for 
survival’ is not a necessary evil!  Lamarck in 1801 
wrote, 
‘. . . time and favorable conditions are the 
two principal means which nature has 
employed in giving existence to all her 
productions. We know that for her time 
has no limit, and that consequently she 
always has it at her disposal.’ 
 
   Then, it is wrongly residual to say that 
adaptation is not a necessary ingredient for 
survival but to rightly cite the phrase that, 
‘survival of those who are fit to adapt’, and hence, 
it is the fittest organism or a biological system 
which can visage the disordered environmental 
states, since, environment enforces a system to 
adapt. But then also, its survival and sustenance 
proves that adaptation has already taken apace 
and this adaptive survival depends on the 
inherent motivational capacity of the organism 
which is stimulus induced and may have some 
genetic determinants, and where one requires 
stimulus for motivation to adapt, would activate  
specific genes in general. Interactions between 
genome and the environment and the concept of 
genetic load (Muller 1950) that underlines the 
interplay of mutation and adaptation as a 
consequence of genetic heterogeneity where 
mutation as basis for variation is then the 
underlying principle of the operation for natural 
selection. Genetic variations in agents can be 
identified by identifying individual heterozygous 
gene loci. This genetic variation in the way of 
gene polymorphism imparts individual agents 
with inclusive fitness, innate immunity against 
diseases and heterogeneity in behavior. When 
we speak about the common origin and 
foundation of behavior in human, we also mean 
the correlation between habitat and genetic 
variation. This commonality fades due to 
individual heterogeneity on account of separation 
in time and space as well as due to the exposure 
of each and every individual agent to internalities 
of heterogeneous resources available at their 
disposal. Classification of behavior in terms of 
developmental origin and the ontogeny of 
behavioral adaptiveness may provide evidences 
of the sources of behavioral distinctiveness 
where cellular factors as expression of inherited 
determinants of individual behavior are related to 
specific gene expression and activation. This 
deference may be also derived from the 
motivational energy concept of Hinde (1960) 
where, it is important to quantify following 
learning induced stimulus recognition, of how 
much energy is required for specific memory 
related gene expression relative to its temporal 
factors. For if, genetic fitness is reflected in an 
organism’s biological adaptiveness relative to its 
environment, then, fitness precedes adaptation, 
yet as well, fitness is not achievable without 
adaptation.  Thus, if I classify adaptation is as (i) 
genetic, (ii) neural or cognitive and (iii) physical 
adaptation, an organism must contain inherited 
genetic factors as well as the required potential 
energy to be embedded in its system in order to 
adapt and survive. Furthermore, neural or 
cognitive adaptation should take place before 
physical, but only if the physical state can 
sustain, and then it is again the fitness factor of 
Darwin that we consociate upon, where, genetic 
fitness may determine whether an organism is fit 
to adapt. Here, it seems that fitness to adapt 
comes before survival, because, if survival has 
already been in place, it could not have been 
without any such adaptations (homeostatic 
adaptations) at all. The great quandary is that, 
neither Darwin nor Lamarck was incorrect, but 
indeed they were complementarily wrong about 
each others propositions which were reciprocally 
correct however yet, both were approved in 
factual senses. But ostensibly, it presents a 
dilemma similar to the one where it becomes 
difficult to ascertain whether the hen has laid her 
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egg or hatched out of it first, unless adaptation is 
called for in to explain the hypothesis. However, 
one may find some clear indication out of my 
discourse that Lamarck indeed, posed some 
serious threats to Darwin’s dispositions. Although 
this is not an appropriate place to counter such 
arguments, and a detail discussion on this 
subject is beyond the scope of this paper, still 
however, I have summarized the relative 
association of adaptive economics to the theory 
of the origin of evolutionary adaptation by 
studying the intricacies of agent behavior model 
under cluster settings. 
 
6. Conclusion 
  
Several conclusions can be drawn on the basis of 
the above study. In terms of modern behavioral 
and cognitive economics, I have outlined the 
dynamics of employee-management-behavior 
cycle (Fig.1) under organizational surroundings. 
The important effects of continuous evaluative 
learning on the behavioral mutation of agents 
have also been delineated. The implication, in my 
mind, is a step forward in understanding the 
dynamicity of institutional work culture in relation 
to employee behavior, their periodic adaption to 
innovation in learning, and acquired fitness. 
Perhaps, the impact of learning on agent 
behavioral modifications and a deeper 
consecutive implication on their physiological 
dispositions of how learning induces gene 
expression and memory formation is in greater 
part, the most significant outcome of this study. 
Of why and how and what factors predispose 
agents to stress or constraints of imposed 
contingencies from the part of the management in 
an organization has been mathematically 
underlined. The rationalities of imposed rules and 
routines that follow teleological process have also 
been summarized in relation to comparative 
analysis of similar behavioral reflections in 
animals. It is to be legibly noted that like human 
beings, animals also posses some degree of 
adaptive intellect and organizational skills which 
they demonstrate under unsympathetic 
environmental constraints, or by training. To 
conclude herein, I may posit that although several 
aspects related to organization behavior and 
adaption in terms of behavioral basis have been 
outlined in this paper which may shed some new 
light on this field of cognitive economics, yet still, 
much remains to be considered for future 
research. ⁪ 
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Proof of Lemma 3:  if                       
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Proof: 
Let us consider in the second generation a variation of (14.3). Then, I may write as 
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Then, by solving for ‘l’ in the third generation, we obtain: 
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Hence, from third generation onwards, gene expression will be the result of both innate and 
acquired behavior as well as learning and if, in an another variant of the same expression, 
                                                      ( )( )( )2 2 2i a a i e tl h h h h S Sω= + + +  
Solving for ‘’, one will obtain, 
                          
2
2 2 3 3 3 3 2 2
i a e i a t i e i t a e a t a i e a i t
l
h h S h h S h S h S h S h S h h S h h S
ω =
+ + + + + + +
 
That is, from the 3
rd
 generation onwards, gene expression will be determined by learning as well. 
This endorse the fact that how continual learning will effect agent behavior and help develop 
memory proteins and add to the biochemical repertoire of agents. This also proves equation (14.8). 
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Textbox 1. 
General Description of Neurophysiology of Behavior 
I will briefly revisit some of the basic technical facts 
related to how learning induces physiological, genetic 
or biochemical changes in the human body. It is 
imperative to note that the process of learning, whether 
observational or practical, brings in some innovative 
changes in the human physiological system. There are 
many intracellular and intercellular factors that relate 
learning to these enduring changes as effect. There 
occurs a myriad of biochemical reactions in response 
to learning. Learning is but gaining new information, 
experiences or in crude sense, one of the sources of 
stimulus as input for sensory analysis, whether 
repetitive or one time event. The question then, 
remains about the particular nature of stimulus and the 
threshold of the intensity or power of stimulus that is 
fed into the central cognition system. On molecular 
level, any stimuli (stimulus) of a certain threshold excite 
sensory neurons, for example, visual stimuli activate 
human sensory neurons and help educe motor actions. 
To understand sensory information analysis and origin 
of motor patterns at the cellular level, interganglionic 
impulse conduction/modulation and signal transduction 
mechanisms need to be understood, as also, the role 
of sensory feedback in motor pattern generation. 
Previous experiments with isolated squid and leech 
neurons have shown the selective excitation-inhibition 
of ganglionic neurons with intracellular current injection 
to identify the origin of motor patterns. Since actions 
are motor responses of basic patterns of coordination 
generated by central neurons, it is essential to 
understand the biochemical basis of molecular 
neurotransmission and cellular interactions that takes 
place at the synaptic end and as also, to elicit the 
electro-chemical events involving voltage-gated 
channels within the neuron itself. This takes place 
when a sensory stimulus excites a neuron and 
generates action potentials. Sensory receptors 
transduce stimuli into electrical responses by activating 
ion channels in their membranes. The plasma 
membrane of the neuron is semipermeable, being 
highly permeable to K
+
 and slightly permeable to Cl
−
 
and Na
+
. The electrical events that constitute signaling 
in the nervous system depend upon the distribution of 
ions (Na
+
, K
+
/ Cl
−
) on either side of the nerve 
membrane. The resting potential is maintained by the 
sodium-potassium pump. In most neurons this 
potential, called the membrane potential, is between 
−60 and −75 millivolts. When the inside of the plasma 
membrane has a negative charge compared to the 
outside, the neuron is said to be polarized. Any change 
in membrane potential tending to make the inside even 
more negative is called hyperpolarization, while any 
change tending to make it less negative is called 
depolarization, which initiates action potential. This is 
the result of potential differences across the 
semipermeable membrane that initiates all action 
potentials. At the receptor level, it is however important 
to elicit the interplay between chemical messengers 
and hormones which induce biophysical-biochemical 
changes. Action potential in the CNS in response to 
stimuli depolarizes receptor cells which are Ca
2+
 
dependent. Ca
2+
 is also essential to initiate smooth 
muscle contraction, as in cardiac muscles. The 
neuroendocrine responses of learning are attributed to 
secretion of neurotransmitters and hormones i.e. 
dopamine (precursor of norepinephrine), serotonin (5-
HT  agonists) at the presynaptic terminal from 
synaptic vesicles. The concentration of serotonin is 
somewhat lower but it is related to behavioral patterns 
like sleep, mood and sexual urge. There are certain 
charge carriers across nerve cell membrane (Ca
2+
, 
Na
+
) to generate action potentials in nerve cells and 
motor neurons (depolarization). Ca
2+ 
entry into the 
presynaptic terminal is the first step to the release of 
acetylcholine (from cholinergic receptors) from nerve 
terminals (voltage-dependent gate) that allow cations 
to permeate. This means that much more Na
+
 and Ca
2+
 
diffuse into the cell than K
+
 diffuse out, causing 
depolarization and excitation of the neuron or muscle 
cell. Excitability of neurons is thus calcium (Ca
2+
) 
dependent in the central nervous system where 
extracellular Ca
2+ 
is essential for neuromuscular 
transmission (depolarization) as also, for any 
substance secretion from a cell (hormone, 
neuropeptides, mucus). These calcium channels are in 
turn controlled by neurotransmitters and aminoacids at 
the postsynaptic receptor sites, i.e. GABA, glutamate, 
serotonin (5HT receptors) through feedback 
mechanisms. GABA is highly concentrated in the brain 
and is produced from glutamate. This direct control of 
voltage dependent Ca
2+
 channels is modified by a 
second messenger, the cAMP through some complex 
mechanisms which is beyond the scope of this paper.  
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  Fig. 1 The employee (agent)-management-behavior cycle. 
 
